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 ! 1 
Abstract 
This paper examines the spatial externalities of conventional and organic pest control methods to 
determine if, and how, the two types affect each other. These interactions make the problem 
more complicated than the usual analysis of a single externality. The numerical simulation model 
includes  one  organically  managed  and  one  conventionally  managed  field.  One  pest  and  one 
predator  of  the  pest  move  between  the  two  fields  over  five  seasons.  In  each  season,  the 
conventional grower has the option of applying a broad-spectrum pesticide that kills the predator 
a selective pesticide that has no adverse effects on the predator but is either more expensive or 
less  effective  than  the  broad-spectrum  pesticide.  The  organic  grower  can  apply  an  organic 
pesticide, augment the predator population, or both. The simulation model identifies the socially 
optimal pest control decisions and the Nash equilibrium decisions of both growers over the five 
growing seasons. The relative price and efficacy of the selective pesticide, the type of predator, 
and  the  type  of  pest  introduction  all  influence  whether  or  not  either  or  both  growers  make 
inefficient  decisions.  Under  certain  conditions,  regional  pest  management,  equivalent  to 
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1. Introduction   
The ever-rising demand for organic products has and will continue to increase organic acreage in 
the United States. This increase in acreage will increase the frequency of interactions between 
conventional and organic farms as they more often share the same regional landscape.
1 Sharing 
the  same  landscape  implies  that  they  share  spatially  dispersed  pest  and  beneficial  insect 
populations. The movement of these organisms links farms within a region, potentially causing 
one  grower’s  pest  control  decisions  to  affect  other  growers.  This  paper  examines  these 
interactions in a spatial-dynamic framework. 
The model includes two representative profit-maximizing growers. One utilizes organic 
production methods on one field, and, on the neighboring field, the other utilizes conventional 
methods. Both growers manage an insect pest that moves freely between the two fields. Their 
pest management decisions directly and/or indirectly affect the region’s population of a predator 
of the pest, and this predator provides naturally occurring pest control. The movement of the pest 
and  the  separate  movement  of  the  predator  link  the  growers’  fields  spatially,  while  the 
generations  of  the  pest  and  predator  link  the  fields  temporally.  The  analysis  compares  the 
growers’ privately optimal pest control decisions that maximize their individual profits to the 
socially  optimal  decisions  that  maximize  the  total  profit  obtained  by  the  two  growers.  This 
comparison identifies situations where a grower’s private choices over pest control lower the 
region’s  total  profits  via  negative  externalities  created  by  the  movement  of  organisms. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 During the 1990s, demand for organic products increased an average of 20% annually. This 
growth in demand fueled growth in organic crop acreage. Between 1992 and 2005, organic 
cropland more than quadrupled, increasing from 403,400 acres to just over 1.7 million acres 
(USDA, 2008). Prior to the current recession, demand was predicted to increase annually by an 
additional 9 to 16% through 2010 (Dimitri and Oberholtzer, 2005). Since the beginning of the 
recession,  total  sales  have  continued  to  increase,  but  at  a  slower  rate  (California  Certified 
Organic Farmers, 2009). ! 3 
Interestingly,  the  model  shows  that,  even  when  externalities  exist,  they  need  not  result  in 
inefficiencies. This is due, in part, to the discrete choice nature of the problem and, in part, due to 
the interactions of the externalities. The presence of interacting externalities can either mitigate 
or exacerbate the effects of the externalities. This paper will demonstrate how pesticide attributes 
affect the presence of inefficiencies, and it will show that the type of pest pressure and the type 
of predator are important determinants of whether or not inefficient decisions are made. 
2. Pest Control 
Pest control is an important part of agricultural production. Crop production systems include the 
host  crop,  one  or  more  pests  that  damage  or  eat  the  crop,  and  one  or  more  predators  or 
parasitoids  that  eat  or  lay  eggs  in,  respectively,  the  pest  population(s).  These  predators  and 
parasitoids, known as natural enemies, provide pest control. Growers can introduce other pest 
control  agents,  such  as  pesticides  or  commercially  purchased  natural  enemies,  into  the  crop 
production system. Additionally, they can use cultural controls such as adjusting planting or 
harvesting times, choosing pest-resistant varieties, improving field sanitation, or managing water 
and nutrients. When the cost of controlling the pest is less than the revenue lost due to pest 
damage, growers maximize profit by choosing a pest control method. The type of pest control 
chosen in part depends on the type of production used by the grower. Conventional growers have 
a wider range of pest control options than organic growers; organic regulations restrict organic 
growers to a subset of the options available to conventional growers.  
Pest  controls  kill,  harm,  or  repel  insect  pests,  and  they  can  also  negatively  affect 
beneficial insects like natural enemies. The toxicity of all pest control options to natural enemies 
falls along a spectrum, ranging from highly toxic to non-toxic.  
Pesticides with a broad range of targeted pests tend to fall at the highly toxic end of the ! 4 
spectrum.  All  synthetic  broad-spectrum  pesticides  (BSPs),  such  as  organophosphates, 
carbamates, and pyrethroids, fall at this end. These pesticides are not species-specific, so any 
particular BSP is capable of killing multiple pest species and may have lethal and sub-lethal 
effects on natural enemies.
2 Neem oil and spinosad, two products with organically approved 
formulations, may fall next on the spectrum, although evidence is mixed. In laboratory studies, 
they have negative effects on natural enemies, yet in the field, no evidence of pest resurgences 
due to lowered enemy populations after applications has been reported (Johnson and Krugner, 
2004). This may be due to laboratory conditions that differ considerably from field conditions. 
Pest controls that have short-lived residues and/or only target a small range of insects fall 
in the moderately toxic range. Insect pathogens, such as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), have some 
lethal and sublethal effects on natural enemies, but less than many synthetic BSPs, neem oil, and 
spinosad, due to short-lived residues (Johnson and Krugner, 2004)
3. Like neem oil and spinosad, 
some formulations of insect pathogens are approved for organic use. Insect growth regulators 
target specific hormones that interfere with the insect’s development, preventing the individual 
from becoming a reproductive adult. Each regulator is specific to a group of insects that contain 
the same hormone, so these will not kill natural enemies that do not contain the specific hormone 
(Cornell University Cooperation Extension, 2001). Since insect growth regulators are synthetic 
materials, only conventional growers can apply them.   
Pheromones have little toxicity to natural enemies because each pheromone targets only 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Sublethal effects include reductions in reproduction rates and lifespans, interference with the 
enemies’ ability to locate prey or hosts, and suppression of predators’ appetites. All of these 
sublethal effects decrease the natural enemies’ supply of pest control services (Dresneux et al, 
2007). 
3 The residue length refers to Bt that is applied to fields, not Bt produced by genetically modified 
organisms. In the latter case, Bt is constantly present. ! 5 
one species of pest. Growers use these naturally produced chemicals to attract pests into traps or 
to interfere with mating (Cornell University Cooperative Extension, 2001). Some application 
methods and formulations of pheromones are approved for organic use. Organically approved 
natural repellants such as herbal teas, plant extracts, and clay or rock powder repel pests with 
little to no effect on natural enemies (Zehnder et al., 2007).   
Cultural  and  biological  controls  fall  at  the  non-toxic  end  of  the  spectrum.  While 
biological  control  occurs  naturally  when  beneficial  insects  are  present,  growers  can  also 
encourage increased biological control. They can provide habitat, pollen, and nectar to attract 
natural enemies to their fields and may be able to establish populations large enough to keep pest 
populations under control (Zehnder et al., 2007). If augmentation through resource provision 
does not establish sufficient natural enemies, the grower can purchase commercially available 
natural enemies to release in the field. Growers may make releases as often as once a week 
during the growing season, depending on the crop and natural enemy involved (Zehnder et al., 
2007). In addition to the chemical and biological control methods discussed, growers can use 
cultural controls, which have limited effects on natural enemies. 
Despite their high toxicity to natural enemies, many growers still rely on BSPs. In 2007, 
the three most commonly applied insecticide active ingredients were chlorpyrifos and acephate, 
organophosphates, and aldicarb, a carbamate. Thirty-five percent of all pounds of insecticide 
applied in 2007 were organophosphates (Grube et al. 2011).  More selective controls such as 
insect growth regulators and pheromones tend to be more expensive than BSPs due to high 
development and production costs and are most effective at controlling low to moderate pest 
outbreaks (Welter et al., 2005). Cost analyses performed for strawberry and cabbage show that 
for these crops, the use of natural enemies can cost thousands of dollars more per acre than ! 6 
conventional  pest  management  involving  BSPs  (Lundgren  et  al.,  2002;  Trumble  and  Morse, 
1993). Thus, the use of BSPs is more widespread than the use of selective methods due to both 
efficacy and cost considerations. 
In contrast, certified organic farms cannot use synthetic BSPs and must rely on other 
methods. The use of natural enemies, when viable, can be a low cost alternative to organic 
pesticides  (Zehnder  et  al.,  2007).  While  the  use  of  locally  available  natural  enemies  is  a 
potentially inexpensive and environmentally sound form of pest control relative to other organic 
methods, conventional pesticide use on nearby fields can make the use of natural enemies more 
challenging. A respondent to a 2010 California citrus grower survey wrote that the pesticides 
used  by  a  neighboring  strawberry  grower  killed  predatory  insects  and  resulted  in  reduced 
predatory  insect  populations  on  his  own  fields.  According  to  a  supplier  of  commercially 
available natural enemies, organic growers growing various crops complain of reductions in, and 
in some cases complete elimination of, natural enemy populations from conventional pesticide 
applications on neighboring farms (M. Cherim, Green Methods, personal communication, July 1, 
2008). This pest control problem is economically significant since the less expensive and/or 
more effective conventional method imposes an externality on the organic grower.  
At the same time, organic practices can be less effective than conventional practices 
(Tamm et al., 2004), which can lead to a negative externality imposed on nearby conventional 
growers. Additionally, as will be shown below, higher pest levels on organic farms may drive the 
movement of the natural enemy population, altering the negative externality imposed by the 
conventional  grower.  Finally,  augmentative  releases  of  natural  enemies  can  yield  a  positive 
externality  because  the  released  natural  enemies  can  provide  pest  control  for  neighboring 
growers as well. ! 7 
Previous literature has examined components of the problem we address. Work has been 
done  on  optimal  management  strategies  for  multiple  growers  who  act  cooperatively  and  are 
linked by the movement of insects (Ives and Settle, 1997; Levins, 1969).  Keane et al. (2003) 
model the effects experienced on surrounding farms when one grower unilaterally alters his pest 
control, and all growers follow a given pest management plan.  Finally, several model the choice 
among different types of pest control strategies, but they do not incorporate cross-grower effects 
(Liu et al., 2005 and Reichelderfer and Bender, 1979). We include such effects in my model. To 
the best of my knowledge, our work is the first to model the choice of pest control strategies by 
individual profit-maximizing heterogeneous growers whose fields are linked by the movement of 
pests and natural enemies. 
3. Economic Model 
We model two adjacent and equally sized fields, an organic field, o, and a conventional field, c. 
Field sizes are normalized to 1. Each field is managed by a profit-maximizing grower. Time is 
indicated by t. One pest, with population !!, and one predator of the pest, with population !!, 
move between the two fields. In the absence of the pest, grower i, i ! {c, o}, could achieve a 
potential output of !
!, assuming that pest control decisions are separable from all other grower 
decisions with respect to output. While for some real-world cases this is a strong assumption, it 




!, where K is the pest carrying capacity per field. In total, we consider four pest 
control methods: three pesticides whose type will be indexed by k = o (organic), S (selective), 
and B (BSP), and predator augmentation (A).  
The conventional grower chooses between two pest control methods: a selective pesticide 
(SP) application, !!
!, and a BSP application, !!
!. Pesticide type k kills !!
!!!
! pests. We model ! 8 
pesticide use on a per-acre basis; that is, we normalize the recommended application rates such 
that !! ! !!.
4
 We specify that !! ! !!, implying that the effectiveness of the SP is less than or 
equal to the effectiveness of the BSP. The SP, representing a selective conventional option such 
as an insect growth regulator, does not kill or impair the predator, allowing the predator to 
provide the conventional grower with pest control. In contrast, the BSP kills !!!! predators, 
where !! is the number of predators killed per unit of BSP applied. The BSP also impairs all 
surviving predators, preventing them from consuming pests in the time period of the application. 
The price per unit of pesticide type k is !!, where !! ! !!, implying that the SP is at least as 





where k is the conventional grower’s choice of pesticide for period t. 
The organic grower chooses among three pest control options each period. He can apply 
an organic pesticide, !!
!, with a unit price of !!; release natural enemies, !!, with a unit price of 
v; or do both. Like the conventional grower, the organic grower uses recommended application 
rates. The organic pesticide application rate is normalized to be the same as the recommended 
selective  and  BSP  application  rate  per  acre.  The  organic  pesticide,  representing  a  selective 
method like a plant extract or pheromone trap, is more expensive than the BSP, and it is assumed 
to be half as effective as the BSP. The predators released by the grower are assumed to have the 
same effect on the pest population as naturally occurring ones, although in reality, the former 
type of predator may not be as effective as the latter. When used in combination, the total control 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Normalizing application rates to be equal across pesticide types allows us to focus on the cost 
and effectiveness of an application per acre (or field) instead of a pound of pesticide per acre. 
Growers commonly follow recommended application rates, so representing the grower’s pest 
management decision as a choice of method is more accurate than representing it as a choice of 
method and, contingent on that method, a pounds per acre choice. ! 9 
provided  by  augmentation  and  the  organic  pesticide  does  not  exceed  the  efficacy  of  the 




! ! !!!. Both growers’ profit maximizing pest control choices will depend on the 
population dynamics of the pest and predator.  
4. Population Model 
The population dynamics connect the fields through time and space. We use the population 
models and parameter values specified in the analysis of natural enemy enhancement by Kean et 
al. (2003), an article from the entomological literature that examines the pest control benefits of 
biological  control.  We  chose  to  utilize  their  work  because  of  the  realism  embedded  in  the 
population dynamics; both the pest and predator populations face limits to their growth. Field i’s 




! , where !! is the maximum per capita 
growth rate possible. Field i’s pest population declines due to predation. Each natural enemy 











! pests. Pesticides kill !!!!
! pests in each time period.  
Movement between fields also affects the pest populations. The net gain in pests on field 
i  is  !! !!
! ! !!
!   where  j  represents  the  other  field.  A  certain  portion  of  the  difference  in 
populations, !!, moves between the fields. If !! ! !, then pests disperse in order to obtain a 
greater quantity of resources per individual, and if !! ! !, then pests aggregate. When !! ! !, 
there is no density dependence of movement. This analysis will focus on the case where pests 
diffuse (!! ! !) since this is a common assumption in the pest control literature. ! 10 
We consider two types of pest pressure. The first assumes that a certain number of pests, 
!!,  is  introduced  onto  each  field  prior  to  the  first  production  period,  but  after  this  initial 
introduction or infestation of the pests, no more pests enter the two field system (“initial pest 
introduction”). Under these conditions, if !! is a small to moderate introduction, the growers are 
capable of eliminating the pest during the time periods modeled. Once the pest is eliminated, the 
growers no longer need to apply control. The second type of pest pressure assumes that in each 
time period ! pests move onto each field from outside of the two-field system (“recurrent pest 
introductions”). Under these conditions, the growers cannot eliminate the pest. In this analysis, 
we assume that ! is constant for all time periods, ! ! !! and ! in period 1 will be denoted !! 
in order to represent the dynamics for both types of pest pressure within the same equation. 
Although  in  reality  pests  often  move  between  neighboring  fields  during  the  growing 
season,  this  model  implicitly  assumes  they  move  only  between  growing  seasons  due  to  the 
discrete time aspect of this problem and the small number of time steps used for simplicity in the 














! ! !! !!!!
! ! !!!!
! ! !, 
where  will equal zero for all t for the case of only an initial introduction of pests and will 
equal a positive constant when ! ! !!!!!!!!! for the case of recurrent pest introductions.
5 If the 
conventional grower applies the BSP in period t, then the BSP eliminates the predator’s ability to 
locate the pest ( ) and/or attack the pest ( ). With these effects present, the predator 









! ! !! !!!!
! ! !!!!
! ! !. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 When t = 1, !!!!
! ! !!, which is set equal to the same positive constant as !. 
 N
a
i = 0 f
i = 0! 11 




!  through reproduction 
where !! is the number of preadtors that result from consuming a pest. The natural death rate of 
the predator, g, results in 
!!
!
! predator deaths each period. We consider two types of predators, and 
the  type  determines  the  predator  dispersal  function.    For  the  first  type,  we  assume  that  the 
predator  moves  from  the  field  with  a  lower  pest  population  to  the  field  with  a  higher  pest 
population. If !!
! ! !!







 predators. Conversely, if !!
! ! !!
!, field 







 predators. This sort of movement is associated with specialist predators 
who only consume a small number of insect species. As a result of their specialization, they 
actively seek out the pest species (Hajek, 2004). This is in contrast to generalist predators who 
consume a wide range of insect species and, consequently, move from areas of higher predator 
density to areas of lower predator density to obtain a higher level of resources per individual 
instead of actively seeking out the pest species (Hajek, 2004). In this case, field i will receive 
!!!! !
! ! !!
!!  predators  from  field  j  where  !! ! !.    If    ! !
! ! !!
!,  there  will  be  a  net  loss  of 
predators from field i to field j.  For simplicity, the predator dispersal will be represented as 
!!!!!!!), where !! and !! are vectors of the two grower’s predator and pest populations.  The 
functional form used will be the one that represents the type of predator being modeled. 
Finally, pest control can affect the predator population. The BSP kills !!!! in any time 
period  when  it  is  applied,  and  augmentation  adds  !!  predators.  The  selective  and  organic 
pesticides have no direct effect on the predator population. If the conventional grower uses the 
SP, then the predator population in time t is: ! 12 
(3) !!
! ! !!!!







! ! !!!!!!!! 
If the conventional grower uses the BSP, any predators that survive the application become too 
impaired to attack the pest population, and without consuming the pest, the predators cannot 






! ! !!!!!!!! 
The organic grower’s predator population in time period t is 
(5) !!
! ! !!!!







! ! !!!!!!!! 
Combining the economic and population models creates a bioeconomic simulation model. Table 
1  contains  a  summary  of  all  variables  used  in  the  simulations,  their  definitions,  and  their 
numerical values or ranges.  
The simulation model contains five growing seasons, ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!. The use of five 
growing seasons allows the insects to move four times, and consequently allows growers to 
affect each other four times. However, this number of time periods is small enough to keep the 
problem  a  manageable  size  for  the  optimization  methods  that  will  be  described  below. 
Additionally, a relatively short time horizon is appropriate in the context of pest management. 
With  invasive  species  bringing  new  pest  problems,  pesticide  companies  introducing  new 
pesticides  on  the  market,  and  changing  weather  patterns  changing  pest  conditions,  one  can 
reasonably assume that growers do not plan their pest control on a long-term time horizon as 
they might do for decisions such as long-term investments in equipment. However, growers who 
are interested in utilizing natural enemies will likely think beyond one growing season since 
populations of beneficials generally build up over time. Consequently, the choice of five time 
periods allows for the possibility that growers consider multiple periods without assuming that ! 13 
they have pest management decisions planned for the next twenty years. 
5. Two Optimization Problems 
To identify cases where private decisions lead to inefficient outcomes, we compare the privately 
optimal and socially optimal decisions. We solve for the private optimum as a Nash equilibrium 
between two non-cooperative growers, as recommended by Horowitz et al. (1996). Each grower 
maximizes his own profits over the five time periods without considering how his actions affect 
his neighbor. However, each grower considers how the neighbor’s pest management choices may 
affect his own profits and chooses his best response. We assume that in the social optimum, joint 
profits are maximized over the five time periods, taking into account how the growers’ decisions 
affect each other’s profits.
6 When the two solutions diverge, inefficiencies will exist. In such 
cases, the growers would benefit from an intervention that encourages cooperation or induces the 
socially optimal decisions. In many cases, even though pest control externalities are present, the 
Nash equilibrium decisions align with the socially optimal decisions.   
5.1. Private profit maximization 
In the private profit maximization problem, the organic and conventional growers simultaneously 
maximize profits subject to the same set of pest and predator population dynamics. The organic 






























! ! !! !!!!
! ! !!!!
! ! ! 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 While pesticides may generate negative externalities that occur off-farm, such as surface water 
contamination or indoor air pollution, we focus only on externalities that occur within the two-
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(9) !!
! ! !!!!

















































subject to (7) though (10).  
  To  eliminate  affects  of  terminal  condition  assumptions,  we  assume  that  the  ending 
populations of the pest and predator do not affect the growers’ profit calculations. This would 
occur  if  growers  switched  to  a  different  crop  after  five  years  that  has  different  pests  and 
predators, if the growers converted or sold their land to a non-agricultural use, or if growers 
simply do not know conditions well enough that far into the future to determine the value of 
pests and predators. This assumption, however, does make the growers less likely to conserve the 
predator in the final period. 
  To solve for the Nash equilibrium, we use Matlab to simulate every possible combination 
of decisions (7,776 combinations) and then determine the combination that is each grower’s best 
response. 
5.2. Social optimum 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 We assume that each grower’s field is homogenous, implying that the grower would not choose 
to apply one method for a portion of the field and another method for the remaining portion. ! 15 























subject to (7) through (10). As we do to identify the Nash equilibrium, we simulate joint profits 
under all combinations of decisions and determine the combination that maximizes joint profits. 
6. Effects of Relative Conventional Pesticide Attributes with a Specialist Predator 
In some cases, SPs are less effective at controlling the pest than BSPs are, while in other cases 
the price of SPs may exceed the price of BSPs. These two negative attributes could also be 
present in the same SP. In order to determine how the price and efficacy of the SP affect any 
divergence between the social optimum and Nash equilibrium, we vary these two attributes of 
the SP, holding all other parameters constant. For each level of efficacy and price, we evaluate 
the difference in the growers’ socially optimal and Nash equilibrium pest management decisions, 
and we calculate the welfare gains that would be achieved if the social optimum were reached. 
The nature of the problem leads to natural bounds on the range of relative efficacies and prices 
that we examine. We begin by specifying that the SP is equally as effective as the BSP, !! !
!!, and then reduce its effectiveness in increments of 10% of the effectiveness of the BSP until 
it  is  half  as  effective  as  the  BSP.  At  that  point,  its  effectiveness  equals  that  of  the  organic 
pesticide. For relative price, we begin by specifying that the price of the SP is equal to $6, the 
price of the BSP. We increase the price of the SP in increments of $2 from $6 to $18. The 
selective and BSPs are assumed to be twice as effective as the organic pesticide that has a unit 
price  of  $9.  At  a  price  of  $18,  the  SP’s  price  per  unit  of  efficacy  is  equal  to  the  organic 
pesticide’s price per unit of efficacy. If the SP’s price rises above $18, the conventional grower 
will choose the organic pesticide instead of the SP, if avoiding the BSP is optimal.  In total, we ! 16 
examine 7 prices and 6 efficacies, resulting in 42 price and efficacy combinations.  
  We conduct this comparison for the two types of pest pressure previously described: the 
initial pest introduction and recurrent pest introductions. For each relative efficacy and price 
combination, we vary the size of the initial, !!, or recurrent, !, pest introduction(s) from 100 
pests per field to the field carrying capacity of 5,000 pests per field in increments of 100 pests 
per field, yielding 50 populations levels for each SP attribute combination. 
  Figures  1  through  4,  discussed  below,  have  the  same  basic  structure,  so  this  will  be 
discussed  here.  For  each  graph,  the  origin  is  at  (100,6).  At  this  point,  the  SP  is  equally  as 
effective as the BSP and has the same price as the BSP. As the plot moves right along the x-axis, 
the relative efficacy of the SP decreases. As the plot moves up along the y-axis, the price of the 
SP increases. As the plot moves northeast from (100,6), the relative efficacy decreases and the 
price increases simultaneously. All of the graphs in Figures 1 and 3 have the same scale on the z-
axis for comparison purposes. The color scale, however, varies for each panel to ensure clarity in 
the surfaces. Similarly, all of the graphs in Figures 2 and 4 have the same scale on the z-axis for 
comparison purposes, while having different color scales for clarity.  Finally, each value plotted 
on the z-axis represents the value summed or averaged over the range of 50 pest introduction 
levels for the given price and efficacy combination. 
6.1. Initial pest introduction only 
Figure 1 depicts the presence of inefficient decisions as the price and efficacy of the SP vary. 
Panels a and b pertain to the initial pest introduction only. Panel a plots the number of pest 
introduction levels (out of 50 levels) for which the organic grower’s Nash equilibrium decisions 
are not socially optimal for each SP price and efficacy combination. The right-hand panel plots 
the number of pest introduction levels for which the conventional grower’s Nash equilibrium ! 17 
decisions are not socially optimal for each price and efficacy combination.  
  For the conventional grower, if the five-period decision includes the use of the SP in 
some periods, and the BSP in others, he always begins with the SP. Beginning with the BSP and 
switching to the SP would not be optimal because the early season broad-spectrum application 
would reduce the predator population and greatly reduce the benefit of conserving it in later 
periods.  Inefficient  decisions  occur  in  the  Nash  equilibrium  when  the  conventional  grower 
chooses to apply the BSP in an early period when the use of the SP is socially optimal. For the 
initial pest introduction only and the specialist predator, the conventional grower’s inefficient 
decisions only differ from the socially optimal decisions in one growing season, either the first or 
the second season.  
  In  Figure  1,  panel  b,  there  are  two  noteworthy  trends  in  the  conventional  grower’s 
inefficient decisions. First, as the SP’s price increases, there are more introduction levels for 
which the conventional grower’s decision is inefficient. As the price of the SP increases, the 
negative  externality  avoided  by  applying  the  SP  remains  the  same,  but  the  private  cost  of 
applying the SP increases. Consequently, we see that the conventional grower is less likely to 
choose the SP even though it is socially optimal to do so. On the other hand, as the relative 
efficacy of the SP decreases, the net positive externality decreases. This occurs because even 
though the use of the SP conserves the predator, it also causes more pests to remain after the 
application than would remain had the conventional grower applied the BSP. Consequently, we 
see that initially, as SP efficacy decreases, inefficient decisions increase, but after about 70% 
relative efficacy, the inefficient decisions begin to decrease. At lower levels of efficacy, the BSP 
is socially optimal. 
  The organic grower’s inefficient Nash equilibrium decisions all involve cases where the ! 18 
organic grower chooses to apply just the organic pesticide in at least one season when it is 
socially optimal to apply the organic pesticide and make an augmentative release of the predator 
in  the  same  season.  The  augmentative  release  generates  a  positive  externality  for  the 
conventional grower in two ways. First, it adds additional pest control on the organic field, 
decreasing  the  total  number  of  pests  present  in  the  two-field  system.  Second,  some  of  the 
predators  and/or  their  offspring  may  eventually  move  onto  the  conventional  grower’s  field, 
increasing  the  quantity  of  biological  control  occurring  on  that  field.  However,  given  the 
assumption of a specialist predator here and that the less effective organic controls will result in 
elevated pest populations on the organic field, the net movement of predators will be from the 
conventional field to the organic field. This will largely eliminate the second positive externality. 
  Indeed, we see that the organic grower makes few inefficient decisions in this situation, 
and  almost  half  of  the  price,  efficacy,  and  pest  introduction  level  combinations  that  yield 
inefficient decisions are combinations for which the conventional grower’s decisions are also 
inefficient and involve the use of the BSP. For these cases, both growers would benefit from a 
move to the social optimum. 
  In Figure 2, panels a-c, we plot the percent welfare gains achieved by reaching the social 
optimum. The graphs plot the percent increase in profits relative to a case without any pest 
control averaged over the fifty introduction levels for each price and efficacy combination. For 
those introduction levels where the Nash equilibrium decisions are socially optimal, the gain is 
zero, and these zero gains are included in the averages presented. Although the prevalence of the 
conventional grower’s inefficient decisions varies considerably over the parameter space, there is 
little variation in welfare gains. This implies that even though inefficient decisions occur, the 
magnitude of the welfare loss is small on average. ! 19 
6.2 Recurrent Pest Introductions 
Changing  the  nature  of  the  pest  introduction  from  an  initial  introduction  only  to  recurrent 
introductions changes the prevalence of both the organic grower and the conventional grower’s 
inefficient decisions. With recurrent pest introductions, the predator’s food source persists at a 
stable level throughout the five growing seasons. This allows the predator population to increase 
over time. With only an initial pest introduction, the food source declines over time, and so the 
predator  population  also  declines  over  time.  Additionally,  the  predation  rate  per  predator 
decreases  as  the  pest  population  decreases.  Recurrent  introductions  have  two  effects  on  the 
possible externalities. First, the negative externality generated by a BSP application increases 
because such an application kills predators that had the potential to have more offspring and 
higher predation rates compared to predators killed by the BSP with an initial pest introduction 
only. Second, the positive externality generated by an augmentative release increases. Each of 
the  released  predators  can  potentially  provide  increased  control  of  the  pest  because  of  the 
continuous, stable food source. 
  Indeed, we see in Figure 1, panel c that for all price and efficacy combinations, the 
organic grower makes inefficient decisions for more introduction levels than he did with only the 
initial introduction, depicted in panel a. The overall trend in the organic grower’s inefficient 
decisions is a reduction in inefficient decisions as the SP’s relative efficacy decreases. As the 
relative efficacy decreases, the conventional grower provides less pest control for the two-field 
system when he applies the SP. This lowered control lessens the organic grower’s incentive to 
utilize  too  little  pest  control,  and  results  in  the  organic  grower  using  the  socially  optimal 
combination of the organic pesticide and augmentation. 
  For the conventional grower, we still find that at low efficacy levels, the BSP is often ! 20 
socially optimal, and inefficient decisions taper off. However, we see an increase in introduction 
levels for which the conventional grower makes inefficient decisions for cases where the SP’s 
price is from $6 to $12. This is due to the increased negative externality generated by a BSP 
application that makes the SP socially optimal under this type of pest introduction.  
  Figure 4, panels d-f plot the average welfare gains from achieving the social optimum. 
We see that the organic grower can gain an average of almost 6% in profits if the social optimum 
is reached when the price of the SP is $14 and the efficacy of the SP is 90% of the efficacy of the 
BSP. We see that for the conventional grower, achieving the social optimum results in welfare 
losses when the SP is about 70% as effective as the BSP or when the SP is relatively expensive 
with high efficacy. Overall, achieving the social optimum yields the highest percent gains in 
profits when the SP is between 70 and 80% as effective as the BSP, and when the SP is relatively 
expensive but effective. 
  We  see  greater  welfare  gains  with  recurrent  introductions  than  with  only  the  initial 
introduction  because  the  type  of  introduction  increases  the  magnitude  of  the  possible 
externalities. 
7. Effects of Pesticide Attribuites with a Generalist Predator 
Thus far, we have assumed that predators follow the pest population and move to the field with a 
higher pest population. As discussed in section 3, this type of predator movement characterizes a 
specialist  predator.  Because  the  organic  pest  control  methods  are  less  effective  than  the 
conventional  BSP,  the  organic  field  tends  to  have  more  pests  remaining  at  the  end  of  each 
growing  season,  which  causes  predators  to  migrate  there  from  the  conventional  field. 
Consequently, the externalities associated with using the BSP in later periods will be lower than 
in  early  periods  because  fewer  predators  will  remain  on  the  conventional  field.  While  the ! 21 
assumed movement lessens the negative externality of using the BSP in later growing seasons, it 
also  decreases  the  conventional  grower’s  incentive  to  apply  the  SP.  Doing  so  conserves 
predators, but a portion of these predators will move to the organic field. These two impacts 
counteract each other. The first suggests that the specialist dispersal function will decrease the 
number of inefficiencies relative to alternative specifications, while the second suggests that it 
will increase the number of inefficiencies relative to alternative specifications. 
  In  order  to  understand  the  factors  that  determine  the  net  effect,  we  also  consider  a 
generalist predator implying a dispersal function such that predators move from the field with a 
higher predator population to the field with the lower predator population. The less effective 
organic pesticide results in a higher pest population and hence a higher predator population on 
the organic field. This will result in a net movement of predators to the conventional field. As 
was the case for the specialist predator dispersal function, there are two offsetting effects. From a 
social perspective, this movement increases the externality associated with the use of the BSP 
because an application of the BSP will increase the predator population gradient between the two 
fields. From the conventional grower’s perspective, this movement increases his incentive to 
apply the SP because a portion of his conserved predators no longer emigrates to the organic 
field.   
7.1. Initial pest introduction only 
With an initial pest introduction and a generalist predator, we see more introduction levels for 
which the conventional grower’s decisions are inefficient when the SP is relatively close in price 
to the BSP but with efficacy between 60% and 80% of that of the BSP relative to the scenario 
with  an  initial  introduction  and  a  specialist  predator  (Figure  3).  This  change  in  inefficient 
decisions resembles the change seen when moving from an initial introduction only to recurring ! 22 
introductions  with  a  specialist  predator.  Both  changes  in  scenario  involve  increasing  the 
magnitude of the negative externality generated by the BSP. With an initial introduction and 
generalist predator, we also see an increase in the number of introduction levels that lead to 
inefficient decisions by the conventional grower when the price of the SP is relatively highly. 
Again, this is driven by the increased negative externality generated by the BSP. We do not see 
increases in inefficient decisions when efficacy is quite low because at 50% efficacy, the BSP is 
often socially optimal.  
  The organic grower’s pattern of inefficient decisions is similar to the case with an initial 
introduction  and  a  specialist  predator  except  that  the  inefficient  decisions  are  slightly  more 
concentrated at higher SP prices. This is likely driven by the conventional grower’s inefficient 
decision to apply the BSP instead of the targeted pesticide, which decreases the organic grower’s 
incentive to augment the predator population in addition to applying the organic pesticide. 
  As  we  saw  for  the  case  of  a  specialist  predator  and  an  initial  introduction  only,  the 
welfare gains obtained by reaching the social optimum are small for the case of a generalist 
predator and an initial introduction only (Figure 3, panels a-c). 
7.2. Recurrent pest introductions 
As  discussed  earlier,  with  recurrent  pest  introductions  the  externality  generated  by  a  BSP 
increases relative to the case with only an initial introduction because predators in the former 
scenario have a higher reproductive potential. Combining this increase in externality with the 
increase that occurs due to a generalist predator would seem to imply that this scenario would 
result in many more pest introduction levels for which the conventional grower makes inefficient 
decisions than the previous scenarios. On the contrary, there are fewer introduction levels for 
which the conventional grower makes inefficient decisions in this scenario compared to the case ! 23 
with an initial introduction with a generalist predator and recurrent introductions with a specialist 
predator. This reduction in inefficient decisions occurs because in this scenario, even though the 
potential externality is the greatest, the incentive to conserve predators for his own use is also the 
greatest.  For  many  price,  efficacy,  and  introduction  level  combinations,  the  effects  of  this 
incentive on the conventional grower’s decision outweigh the effects of the negative externality. 
Most of the conventional grower’s inefficient decisions occur when the SP is about 70% as 
effective as the BSP. For efficacies greater than this, the conventional grower tends to choose the 
socially optimal applications involving the SP, and for efficacies lower than 70%, the BSP is 
often socially optimal. 
  The organic grower also makes fewer inefficient decisions in this scenario relative to the 
case of recurrent introductions and a specialist predator. In the latter scenario, predators move, 
on net, towards the organic field, allowing the organic grower to free-ride off of the conventional 
grower’s predators and making him less likely to augment the predator population. With the 
generalist  predator,  the  net  movement  is  towards  the  conventional  grower.  This  means  that 
augmentative releases have a larger positive externality, but it also means that the organic grower 
has a smaller incentive to free-ride and use too little pest control. We see that as the SP efficacy 
decreases, the organic grower’s inefficient decisions decrease, due to a smaller incentive to apply 
too little pest control. 
  While the potential welfare gains from achieving the social optimum were small for the 
case of an initial pest introduction and a generalist predator, they are larger for the case of a 
generalist predator and recurring pest introductions, particularly for the organic grower (Figure 3, 
panels a-c). While the conventional grower makes fewer inefficient decisions in this scenario, 
when those inefficient decisions are made, they have a large effect on the organic grower due to ! 24 
the increase in magnitude of the negative externality generated by BSP applications. The organic 
grower could achieve an average of up to a 9.4% increase in profits relative to the case without 
pest control if the social optimum is achieved when the SP is 80% as effective as the BSP and 
three times its price ($18). The maximum average total welfare gain from achieving the social 
optimum is about 2.7%.  
  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  higher  pest  population  on  the  organic  field  (which 
generates a negative externality) relative to the conventional field drives the net movement of 
predators, under either dispersal function. With a specialist predator, a larger pest population on 
the organic field attracts more predators from the conventional field, decreasing the negative 
externality generated by BSP applications occurring in later seasons. With a generalist predator, 
higher pest levels on the organic field lead to a larger net movement toward the conventional 
field,  increasing  the  externality  generated  by  BSP  applications  in  later  periods.  This  is  an 
interesting case of one externality altering the magnitude of another externality. 
8. Comparison of the Effects of Differing Population Dynamics 
The type of pest introduction and type of predator have substantial effects on the number of 
introduction levels and SP attribute combinations for which either the organic or conventional 
grower  or  both  growers  make  inefficient  decisions.  For  each  introduction  and  predator  type 
combination, 42 price and efficacy combinations were considered, and the simulations were run 
for  50  introduction  levels  for  each  price  and  efficacy  combination  yielding  a  total  of  2,100 
simulation runs. Table 2 presents the percent simulations for each introduction and predator type 
combination  for  which  the  organic  grower  makes  inefficient  decisions,  for  which  the 
conventional  grower  makes  inefficient  decisions,  and  for  which  at  least  one  grower  makes 
inefficient decisions. The last column presents the percent of simulations for which both the ! 25 
organic and conventional growers make inefficient decisions. These simulations are included in 
the numbers for the individual growers. 
The first important thing to note is that for every introduction and predator combination, 
less  than  28%  of  the  simulations  result  in  inefficient  decisions.  For  every  simulation,  both 
positive and negative externalities exist, yet the growers make efficient decisions most of the 
time. This is in part due to the discrete choice nature of the decision.  Thus far, little has been 
discussed  about  the  pest  introduction  levels  at  which  the  growers  are  making  inefficient 
decisions, and this detail sheds light on why we find so many cases of efficient decisions.  As we 
vary the magnitude of the initial or recurrent pest introductions, inefficient decisions tend to 
occur in the middle range of the number of pests introduced when the SP is less effective than 
the BSP, holding its price equal to that of the BSP. This is the case regardless of whether the 
introduction  is  an  initial  introduction  or  recurrent.  For  low  initial  and  recurrent  pest 
introductions, pest pressure is low enough that the conventional grower can control the pest with 
the  SP  despite  its  decreased  efficacy.  As  the  number  of  pests  introduced  increases,  the 
conventional grower switches to the more effective BSP in the Nash equilibrium, but, in doing 
so, he impedes the organic grower’s use of the predator population and reduces social welfare. In 
this range, inefficiencies occur. For high pest introductions, larger numbers of pests remain after 
treatment with the less effective SP. The total cost of damages incurred by both growers from 
these remaining pests outweighs the total benefits of damages prevented by predators conserved 
by using the SP, so the conventional grower’s choice of the BSP is socially optimal. 
When the SP is more expensive than the BSP, but of equal efficacy, inefficient decisions 
also tend to occur in the middle range of the number of pests introduced, regardless of whether 
the introduction is only an initial one or occurs every period.  For low initial and recurrent pest ! 26 
introductions, the pest pressure is low enough that both the organic and conventional growers 
can control the pest without the help of the predator.  The BSP is both privately and socially 
optimal for low initial pest populations.  The organic grower’s pesticide is less effective than the 
conventional pesticides, so as the initial or recurrent pest introduction increases, the organic 
grower will reach a range of pest introduction levels in which he is unable to completely control 
the pest without the help of the predator, but the conventional grower continues to apply the 
BSP.  In this range, inefficiencies occur.  For high pest introduction levels, a larger predator 
population can be supported, and the pest control provided by this population outweighs the 
increased costs of the SP.  Consequently, the conventional grower chooses the socially optimal 
SP for high levels of pest introductions. 
When the SP is both more expensive and less effective than the BSP, both of the two 
tradeoffs occur simultaneously, but there are still cases where the conventional grower chooses 
the socially optimal SP in the Nash equilibrium, and cases where the BSP is socially optimal.  In 
these cases, externalities are present, but the decisions are efficient.   
The second important thing to note is that both the organic grower and the conventional 
grower  make  inefficient  decisions.  While  organic  might  be  considered  a  “better”  type  of 
agricultural production by some, the organic grower can also make inefficient decisions by not 
combining their organic pesticide with augmentation, resulting in a lower total amount of pest 
control utilized than is socially optimal. For three of the four introduction and predator type 
combinations, fewer simulations resulted in the organic grower making inefficient decisions than 
the conventional grower making inefficient decisions. However, with recurrent pest introductions 
and  a  specialist  predator,  19.7%  of  the  simulations  result  in  the  organic  grower  making  an 
inefficient decision. This is almost six percentage points higher than the conventional grower’s ! 27 
maximum number of inefficient decision runs. The organic grower’s inefficient decisions occur 
for more simulations with a specialist predator and recurrent pest introductions because of the 
incentives these population dynamics give the organic grower to free-ride. The organic grower’s 
inefficient decisions all involved not making an augmentative release. With a specialist predator, 
the predators moved on net towards the organic grower. Making the release would have resulted 
in fewer pests remaining on the organic field, which would decrease the number of predators 
leaving the conventional field for the organic field and would also decrease the number of pests 
moving from the organic field to the conventional field. By not augmenting, the organic grower 
receives more predators from the conventional field later on, and the organic grower free-rides 
off of the conventional grower’s predators while also increasing the conventional grower’s pest 
population. With recurrent pest introductions, the predators immigrating from the conventional 
grower’s field have a higher pest control potential than they would with only an initial pest 
introduction, increasing the organic grower’s incentive to free-ride.  
The incentives created by a specialist predator occur with an initial introduction only as 
well, but that type of pest introduction dampens the effect of the specialist predator. With an 
initial introduction, a specialist predator results in 2.4% of simulation runs where the organic 
grower’s decisions are inefficient while with a generalist predator, only 1.8% of simulations have 
this result.  However, this difference in proportion is not statistically significant. With only an 
initial  introduction,  the  potential  pest  control  provided  by  predators  emigrating  from  the 
conventional field is smaller. 
For  the  organic  grower,  a  specialist  predator  results  in  more  simulations  where 
inefficiencies occur compared to a generalist predator and a recurrent pest introduction results in 
more  simulations  where  inefficiencies  occur  compared  to  an  initial  introduction.  For  the ! 28 
conventional grower, however, the two population dynamics components do not yield these same 
patterns. With an initial introduction only, there are more simulations for which the conventional 
grower makes inefficient decisions when the predator is a generalist than when the predator is a 
specialist. With an initial introduction, the increase in the negative externality generated by a 
BSP application that occurs when switching from a specialist to a generalist predator outweighs 
the increase in the incentive for the conventional grower to conserve his predator population. For 
recurrent pest introductions, however, the conventional grower makes fewer inefficient decisions 
when  the  predator  is  a  generalist  than  when  the  predator  is  a  specialist.  With  recurrent 
introductions and the resultant increase in potential biological control provided by the predator, 
the  increase  in  the  incentive  to  conserve  the  predator  outweighs  the  negative  externality 
generated by the BSP. 
When considering the effects of the type of pest introduction, a change from initial to 
recurrent pest introductions with a specialist predator increases the percent of simulations for 
which the conventional grower makes inefficient decisions due to the increase in magnitude of 
the negative externality generated by the BSP. However, when considering a generalist predator, 
a change from initial to recurrent pest introductions decreases the simulations for which the 
conventional  grower  makes  inefficient  decisions  due  to  the  increase  in  magnitude  of  the 
incentive for the conventional grower to conserve the predator population. 
In total, the largest number of simulations with inefficient decisions occurs with recurrent 
pest introductions and a specialist predator.  This is also the combination that yields the highest 
percentage of simulations where a prisoner’s dilemma type solution is found; both growers make 
inefficient decisions in the Nash equilibrium, and both growers would benefit from achieving the 
social optimum. The lowest percentage of simulations with inefficient decisions occurs with an ! 29 
initial introduction and a specialist predator.   
Interestingly, even though recurrent introductions and specialist predator lead to the most 
number of simulations with inefficient decisions, the average welfare loss averaged over all 
simulations  for  a  given  introduction  and  predator  type  combination  is  highest  for  recurrent 
introductions and a generalist predator (Table 3), and this difference is statistically significant. 
This is driven by the large negative externality that results in this scenario from the BSP. Even 
though the conventional grower does not choose it as often in the Nash equilibrium as he does 
with a specialist predator, when he does choose the BSP inefficiently, the resulting welfare loss 
felt by the organic grower is large. One will also note that the expected welfare loss is rather 
small for all scenarios. This is due to the fact that for the majority of simulations, even though 
externalities  are  present,  the  growers  make  efficient  decisions  in  the  Nash  equilibrium.  In 
general, the organic grower benefits more from obtaining the social optimum. Even though total 
welfare  gains  are  small,  if  there  are  other  positive  externalities  associated  with  organic 
production that are not included in this model, policies that help achieve the social optimum with 
respect to the pest control decisions considered here will increase organic profits and improve the 
viability of organic production. 
9. Summary, Conclusions, and Policy Implications 
This paper shows that the movement of pests and predators creates spatial externalities in pest 
control, and that these externalities sometimes, but not always, lead to inefficient pest control 
decisions. For all cases, the inefficiencies tend to occur in the middle range of the number of 
pests introduced for both initial or recurrent pest introductions. At both ends of the introduction 
size, the private and social net benefits of the SP are either both positive or both negative, and, 
consequently, the conventional grower’s decisions are efficient in these ranges. At intermediate ! 30 
levels, the net private and social benefits of the SP change signs, but not at the same initial or 
recurrent pest introduction level. Inefficient decisions made by the conventional grower occur in 
the interval between the introduction levels where the two types of net benefits change signs.  
  Interestingly,  although  the  externalities  from  both  the  organic  and  conventional  pest 
controls are always present, under many sets of parameter values, the externalities are small 
enough that growers still make efficient pest control decisions. Under these conditions, there will 
be no benefits to cooperation. Social welfare may even decrease as a result of cooperation if 
sufficiently large transaction costs are present. Similarly, if efficient pest control occurs in spite 
of the existence of externalities, regulation cannot improve social welfare.  
  These observations have two important policy implications. First, from both an individual 
grower’s perspective and society’s perspective, the development of effective SPs is paramount 
for increasing the adoption of SPs since ineffective SPs are frequently not socially optimal. 
Second, for a given relative efficacy, the development of inexpensive SPs will decrease the 
occurrence of inefficient pest control decisions by increasing the conventional grower’s incentive 
to apply them.  
  The  type  of  pest  introduction  is  an  important  determinant  of  how  often  the  Nash 
equilibrium diverges from the social optimum. With only an initial introduction of the pest, the 
pest population gets smaller in each time period and can potentially be eliminated. As the pest 
population  decreases,  the  predator  population  decreases  as  does  the  amount  of  control  each 
predator provides. With recurrent pest introductions, new pests enter the fields in each time 
period,  keeping  the  predator  population  high  and  increasing  the  number  of  pests  killed  per 
predator each period. Consequently, the value of predators conserved and the value of predators 
augmented or received through dispersal is higher with recurrent pest introductions, and the ! 31 
magnitudes of the positive and negative externalities is greater. This implies that cooperation will 
be more beneficial for recurrent pest introductions.  
  In reality, most crops face a variety of pests. Some species achieve economic importance 
every  year,  requiring  treatment  every  season.  Others  achieve  economic  importance  only 
sporadically.  These  two  cases  can  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  initial  and  recurring  pest 
introductions.  For  example,  the  California  red  scale,  a  major  citrus  pest,  requires  treatment 
almost  every  year  in  California’s  San  Joaquin  Valley  while  the  citrus  bud  mite  is  only 
occasionally found and treated (Ewart et al., 2003). The simulation results suggest that many 
more inefficiencies will occur in the control of the red scale than in the control of the citrus bud 
mite. The results apply to invasive pests as well. Pest control used to treat invasive pests that 
spread rapidly and quickly re-colonize areas after treatment will lead to more inefficiencies than 
pest control used to treat invasive pests that move more slowly and take more time to re-colonize 
after treatment. 
  The type of predator movement also influences the occurrence of inefficient decisions, 
but the effect differs by pest introduction type. Movement associated with generalist predators 
and parasitoids leads to more pest introduction levels that result in inefficiencies than movement 
associated with specialist predators with only an initial pest introduction. Specialist predators 
lead to more pest introduction levels that result in inefficiencies when there are recurrent pest 
introductions. Commercial producers of natural enemies tend to favor production of generalist 
species due to the larger potential market. For pests with recurrent introductions, this practice 
may  help  reduce  inefficient  decisions,  but  for  initial  introductions  only,  it  may  increase 
inefficients.  
While many of the inefficiencies identified here are due to the conventional grower’s ! 32 
choice of pesticides, there are cases where the organic grower makes inefficient pest control 
decisions. Specifically, there are cases where augmentation has a positive externality that is large 
enough to warrant an augmentative release even when it is not profitable for the organic grower. 
In such cases, subsidizing natural enemy releases could help align the Nash equilibrium with the 
social optimum. ! 33 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Variables and Parameter Values: Base Case 
Variable  Definition 
Value/Range 
Organic  Conventional 
!!  Initial Pest Introduction per Field  0-5,000  0-5,000 
!  Recurrent Pest Introduction per Field  0-5,000  0-5,000 
!!  Initial Enemy Population per Field  200  200 
!  Maximum Possible Output  1,000  1,000 
P  Unit Price of Output  $2.50  $2.00 
!!  Unit Price of BSP    $6 
!!  Unit Price of SP    $6-18 
!!  Unit Price of Organic Pesticide  $9   
v  Unit Price of Augmentation   $5   
r  Interest Rate  0.05  0.05 
!!  Number of Pests Killed per Unit of BSP    100 
!!  Number of Pests Killed per Unit of SP    50-100 
!!  Number of Pests Killed per Unit of Organic Pesticide  50   
a  Enemy Search Rate  0.001  0 or 0.001 
f  Enemy Attack Rate  10  0 or 10 
! 
Number of Enemies that Result from Eating/Parasitizing 
a Pest 
0.01  0.01 
g  Enemy Death Rate  50  50 
K  Pest Carrying Capacity per Field  5,000  5,000 
R  Maximum Pest Per Capita Growth Rate  0.2  0.2 
!! 
Proportion of the Difference in Pest Levels that 
Emigrates 
0.5  0.5 
!  Number of Enemies Killed by 1 Unit of BSP    100 
!!  Recommended Units of Pesticide Type k  15  15 
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Figure 1. Number of Initial or Recurrent Introduction Levels for which the Organic 
Grower and Conventional Grower Make Inefficient Decisions in the Nash Equilibrium. 
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Figure 2. Percent Welfare Gains from Achieving the Social Optimum for the Organic Grower, the Conventional Grower, and 
Both Growers Averaged over All Introduction Levels  
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Figure 3. Number of Initial or Recurrent Introduction Levels for which the Organic 
Grower and Conventional Grower Make Inefficient Decisions in the Nash Equilibrium 
with a Generalist Predator. 
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Figure 4. Percent Welfare Gains from Achieving the Social Optimum for the Organic Grower, the Conventional Grower, and 
Both Growers Averaged over All Introduction Levels with a Generalist Predator 
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Table 2. Percent of Pest Introduction Levels for with the Organic and/or 
Conventional Growers Make Inefficient Decisions in the Nash Equilibrium
! 
 
Pest Introduction  Predator 
Type  Organic  Conventional  Total with 
Inefficiencies 
Subset that is 
Prisoner's 
Dilemma 
Initial Only  Specialist  2.38
  7.05***  8.38***  1.05 
Initial Only  Generalist  1.81  11.19*
  11.71***  1.29 
Recurring  Specialist  19.67***  13.95***  27.33***  6.29*** 
Recurring  Generalist  7.62***  9.67*  15.43***  1.86 
*, **, and *** indicate a statistically significant rejection of the hypothesis of pair-wise 
equality with each of the other proportions in the column at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 We examine 42 combinations of price and efficacy and run the simulations for 50 introduction levels for 
each combination leading to 2,100 introduction levels for each of the four introduction and predator type 
combinations. ! 42 
Table 3. Minimum, Mean, and Maximum Percent Profit Gains (Relative to No Pest Control) Possible by Achieving the Social 






Organic  Conventional  Total 
Min  Mean  Max  Min  Mean  Max  Min  Mean  Max 
Initial Only  Specialist  -0.04  0.14***  0.79  -0.24  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.08***  0.30 
Initial Only  Generalist  -0.02  0.38***  1.73  -0.58  -0.11***  0.06  0.00  0.14***  0.68 
Recurring  Specialist  -0.08  1.02***  5.97  -1.04  0.01  0.86  0.07  0.53***  1.91 
Recurring  Generalist  -1.13  1.57***  9.38  -1.97  -0.16***  0.58  0.00  0.61***  2.70 
*, **, and *** indicate a statistically significant rejection of the hypothesis of pair-wise equality with each of the other means in the 
column at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test with known variance.   
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The minimum, maximum, and mean are based on the percent profit gains averaged over 50 pest introduction levels for each SP price and efficacy combination. 
Consequently, the percent gain for a specific pest introduction level and price and efficacy combination may be lower than the minimum listed here or higher 
than the maximum listed here. These statistics are generated from the averages for each price and efficacy combination because for some of the higher pest 
introduction levels, profits for both the Nash equilibrium and social optimum were very small, and divergences between the two equilibria lead to large percent 
gains with small absolute gains.  